Jasmine Revolution sparked unrest in the Arab Countries
Three key Arab countries have witnessed mass upsurge. It originated from Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor who set himself on fire after police had confiscated his vegetable cart. This incident provided the immediate impetus for protests in Tunisia. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia had a long-standing reputation as corrupt and abusive. Ben Ali was reelected with a dubious 90 percent of the vote in 2009, and after a long history of governmental mistreatment. The mass uproar led the president to flee the country following the formation of an interim government which now promises the people that all political parties would now be allowed to operate in Tunisia, political prisoners would be freed and the media would be permitted ‘ total freedom’. They have also decided to free all the people imprisoned for their ideas, their beliefs or for having expressed dissenting opinions. A number of Egyptians have actually imitated Bouazizi’s macabre show of defiance. Egyptians marching through the streets of Cairo proudly brandished Tunisian flags, and their counterparts in Yemen are wearing pink bandannas as a show of solidarity with the people of Tunisia. After mass protests erupted in Egypt and Yemen this week, speculation mounted over whether the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia sparked the unrest. Observers in the media are quick to point out similarities between all three uprisings. The correlation is obvious -- protesters in all three countries have cried out against poverty and demanded the abdication of their rulers. However, claiming that the chaos in Tunisia caused the calls for democracy in Egypt and Yemen may be overstating matters. The similarities between the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen are compelling. There are also notable differences. The spark behind the outbreak of unrest was food prices and unemployment; however this channeled long-standing discontent about the rule of former President Ben Ali, his tight control over the political system and his and his family's control over the Tunisian economy. It is a common trend in Arab politics that the most volatile outbreaks of unrest come when there lies a conjunction between a closed political system, economic downturn, an aging president and a large young population.
Egypt faces a similar challenge to Tunisia in terms of the timing of events. The outbreak of unrest in Tunisia has certainly provided a spark, however, there has been simmering unrest in Egypt for many years, and particularly so after the much-criticized Presidential elections last year. In Egypt, however, the problems are a bit more overtly 'political'. By this, Egypt's economy has been struggling for many years, so the catalyst for events here has not so much been food prices, unemployment or housing shortages but the increasingly heavy-handed tactics of the Mubarak regime and the efforts by the President to smooth the way for his son, Gamal, to succeed him in the coming years. As mentioned above, it is the conjunction of events. The two most important ones here are economic marginalisation and the so-called 'youth bulge'. Outside Tunisia and Egypt, Algeria and Jordan are experiencing similar trends where the economic marginalisation of young people is driving unrest. Unemployment, housing shortages and food prices hit this group the hardest. As the long-standing social contract in the region of less political representation in exchange for state services has collapsed, the most vulnerable Arab states are susceptible to this sort of unrest.
The world sees that the Arab world is home to very resilient authoritarian regimes. They have relied in part on direct oppression, in part on externalizing enemies and in part on this social contract of less political representation in exchange for state services. Where other parts of the world have seen greater political liberalization, this has not happened in the Arab world.
In addition, this region has one of the highest young populations of any region, therefore is susceptible to political unrest when the economy stagnates in the key areas of employment, food prices and housing. Neither country is a democracy in anything more than name. They have both had tightly controlled political systems, with elections serving to deflect attention away from the direct and indirect means. The political elites use to maintain their grip on both the political and economic systems. The protests are therefore in part a call for greater democratic rights, but represent the breakdown of the system that allowed these regimes to maintain such rule for decades. Calling for democratic reform is more a call for accountability for those who have sold the necessity of their rule in exchange for a measure of economic stability.
However, this is not to say that should a regime bring about economic stability again, people in Tunis, Cairo and elsewhere would not continue to pressure for greater political representation. One has opened the door for the other, and it is likely that a new political arrangement will emerge, one that is more politically open but inherently less stable
A good analogy here is Algeria in 1988. Similar riots broke out over the pricing of food, leading to a collapse of the single-party government and the opening of the political system. The Islamists were not behind the initial unrest but were able to take advantage of this in harnessing the unrest and running a very successful election campaign as the face of the disenfranchised.
This, however, led to an army coup in 1992, cancelling the electoral process and the outbreak of a civil war between the government and Islamists that claimed over 200,000 lives by its end in 2000.A similar trend in terms of the Islamists seeking to harness the discontent may happen elsewhere, but it is doubted that the subsequent events that unfolded in Algeria will happen in Tunisia. The key exception here is Egypt. With the Muslim Brotherhood as the established central opposition movement, the political and military elite in Egypt will not be reticent to use direct repression should they fear the Muslim Brotherhood being able to harness their potential power.
Most importantly, it represents what is seen as the first signs of real change to the failing autocratic system of rule that has dominated the region. This need not necessarily be a fully positive outcome, with greater uncertainty and chaos for ordinary civilians in the context of greater political freedoms. However, it may signal the death throes of Cold War-style authoritarianism in the Arab World, and that is a good thing
The Mubarak regime has maintained a state of emergency in this populous country since the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Since then, governmental abuses have spurred the people of Egypt to launch widespread demonstrations a number of times, though they were each eventually quelled. The brutal murder by police last summer of Khaled Said provided the impetus for the most recent surge in anti-government sentiment.The Yemeni government likewise has a poor record in the area of accountability. The government most recently drew the ire of opposition with a proposed constitutional amendment that would eliminate presidential term limits, and through its refusal to postpone parliamentary elections in April. It has also been ineffective in promoting economic development.
The Tunisian military never demonstrated support for President Ben Ali, who fled the country in the wake of mass protests. Since then, two different interim governments have been established. More opposition leaders have been included in the newest administration, but the moves fall short of demands by protesters for a fresh take as several members from the Ben Ali regime remain in top posts. Now the government is offering some packages to the protesters to quell them.
Gamal Mubarak, the Egyptian president’s son and heir apparent, reportedly fled for Britain with his family, the government otherwise shows few signs of imminent collapse. Police have clamped down on demonstrations, and lingering unrest has been sporadic and scattered. Egypt is a key strategic ally for the United States, and Obama’s press secretary Robert Gibbs called the country a " close and important partner " A governmental collapse there could be problematic for U.S. foreign policy. So, they are working very and putting comments very cautiously.
The Yemeni government’s authority outside the capital is nominal at best. It has struggled to counter insurgencies in both northern and southern regions, while al-Qaida continues to stage attacks on Westerners. However, revolution may not be in the cards just yet. President Ali Abdullah Saleh responded to unrest by raising army salaries and ordering the reduction of income taxes. Yemen’s interior minister claims that police have been instructed to protect protesters. Police presence is limited and the protests are largely violence free, and the Christian Science Monitor reports that a regime ouster is unlikely: Rather, Yemen's coalition of opposition parties seeks to tap the post-Tunisia revolution energy in Yemen to pressure the ruling party to make reforms that they had sought months before the Tunisian uprising began. The U.S. would greatly prefer a stable Yemeni government as it struggles to keep al-Qaida neutralized in the region.
Democracy evolved over many centuries in Britain and the rest of Europe and was given a kick along by the Industrial Revolution and two world wars. Generally speaking, the Arab countries are still getting over the colonising influence and interference of European powers, not to mention the imposition of Israel in their midst. This recent history, coupled with the problem of religious fundamentalism, suggests their societies have some way to go. Arab nations have sparked it up, other nations under similar bondage will soon join the revolt. World's undemocratic leaders must certainly be wiped out.
Md. Masum Billah
Program Manager: BRAC Education Program
Email: mmbillah2000@yahoo.com
Saturday, January 29, 2011
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